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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
MARINUS JOHNSON and
ARLIN DAVIDSON,
CASE

vs.
DUKE PAGE, JOSEPH KOYLE
and .fOE SYRETT,
Defendants.

NO. _ _ __

Brief of Appellant, Duke Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case was previously appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court by the appellant from a decision of the District Court
of Juab County. From the appeal the Supreme Court reversed the District Court and among other things stated
that the joint venture did exist, was not terminated, and
that a division of the property of the joint venture must
follow the contract upon termination of the venture. .The
Supreme Court stated "Therefore Page and Johnson each
own one-half interest in the property, Page to be reimbursed
one-half of all his expenditures in the acquiring and pre-
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serving of the property, which would include the cost of
buying and moving the house upon the land to complete
the patent to Mrs. Pratt, taxes and filing fees. Since the
joint venture continued until terminated by the trial court's
decree, Page is not entitled to interest upon the investment
and variation of the contract which provides for such advances. Reversed and remanded for findings and conclusions not inconsistent with this opinion."
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FURNISlllNG THE
DEFENDANT, DUKE PAGE, WITH FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE ABOVE
CASE.
POINT 2
THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING AND DISSOLVING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES, EXCEPT
AS FIXED BY THE TERMS OF ITS DECREE.
POINT 3
THAT THlE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, COSTS ON APPEAL IN
THE AMOUNT OF $187.53.

POINT 4
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING
THE AMOUNT OF EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE
DEFENDANT, PAGE, IN ACQUIRING AND PRESERVING THE PROPERTY, FOR WHICH AMOUNT HE
SHOULD HlAVE JUDGMENT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FURNISHING THE
DEFENDANT, DUKE PAGE, WITH FINDINGS OF
FACf AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE ABOVE
CASE.
Rule 52 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require the
court to find the facts specifically and state separately its
conclusion of law. The court in this case merely served a
copy of the judgment upon the defendant, Page. I might
add that it would appear that the judgment was prepared
by the court and not by either of the parties. The court
rejected two different sets of findings submitted by the defendant, Page.
POINT 2
TH~ COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING AND DISSOLVING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES, EXCEPT
AS FIXED BY THE TERMS OF ITS DECREE.

The court has no right to terminate the relative rights
of the parties under the contract of May 1, 1940. If Johnson has the right to benefit equally from the joint venture
agreement and if it existed until the time it was terminated
by action of the court then, ergo, the defendant Page had
an equal right to share in the profits that the plaintiff, Johnson, has received .from his dealing with property covered.
by the contract of May 1, 1940.
The fact is that the record discloses that the defendant,
Johnson, sold a portion of the property to the defendant,
Davidson. The defendant, Johnson, merely had a joint right
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to the property but did not own an undivided one-half interest which he could sell as a tenant in common.
The defendant, Page, has sued the plaintiffs, Johnson
and Davidson, for an accounting of the profits made by
Johnson from land acquired subject to the joint venture
agreement and the court should not enter a judgment
couched in such terms as would preclude the action of Page
or be res adjudica to the pursuit of his rights thereunder.
The plaintiffs in this action have in their defense to that
action pleaded this judgment for that purpose.
It is the contention of the appellant that neither party
proceeded in the trial court under the theory that the other
had any rights under the original contract. The suit now
pending between the parties is based upon the decision of
this Court and its interpretation of the respective rights
of the parties.
The claim of the appellant against the plaintiffs is
brought under a claim independent of that originally sued
upon in this suit. He should not be barred from asserting
such a claim by over-inclusive language of the court. At
the most the Court should restrict itself to terminating the
joint venture and adjudicating the rights under the issues
joined by the pleadings, but it has no right in stating ''the
rights of the parties thereunder are terminated except to
the extent fixed by the terms of this decree." This is one
of those instances where neither party by their original
theories intended a counterclaim by the other, each claiming an exclusive right to the 400 acres which was the subject of this law suit.
We believe that the right the appellant is now asserting is one of those rights that is optional or permissive for
the appellant to claim at the time. In the altemativ,e it cer-

'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
tainly is one of those rights that justice should require not
be foreclosed.
It would appear that the court has gone far beyond the
instruction of the Supreme Court to the trial court upon the
first hearing of this cause, and certainly exceeds requirements of the decree.
Why should the appellant be precluded from bringing
an action for an accounting on property obtained by appellees whi·ch rights the appellant was unaware of at the original trial?
Actually, the appellant's claim against the appellees
involves property foreign to that sued upon by the plaintiffs.
It is a new claim that might properly have been asserted
as a permissive counterclaim had the appellant thought the
original contract had not been rescinded. When the Court
determined that a joint venture did exist then his rights
became apparent, however, the language of the lower court
would tend to bar them.
It also has the effect of placing upon the appellant the
duty of having this Court rule upon the right to bring a suit
upon a subject matter related but not arising out of the
transaction which was the subject of the instant case. This
point, of course, is the most important point in the appel
-lant's case and is of vital concern to the appellant.

The appellant has not submitted authority on the question of res judicata for reason that to do so the appellant
would have had to show to the Court the facts of an entirely
new case which was not in evidence in the case below.
The question here would seem to be one of equity and
justice and hy context of Rule 13-B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the annotations thereunder it would appear

v
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that the Legislature and the courts do not desire to foreclose a counter-right ex:cept in those cases wherein the counterclaim is a necessary element of the same suit and can
be proved or disproved by the same fact situation.
In any event how, and why, should the trial court
attempt to pre-judge or bar any other rights, the nature of
which are unknown to him. The court's language is much
broader than that necessary to decide the issues of the case.
POINT 3
THAT THIE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, COSTS ON APPEAL IN
THE AMOUNT OF $187.53.
The appellant filed a cost bill within the time allotted
after the remittitur was returned, but by oversight failed
to include the cost of the transcript in the amount of $91.75.
Subsequently, the appellant filed an amended cost bill showing appellant's actual cost in the amount of $187.53; however, the court awarded the appellant only $55.28 costs but
awarded the plaintiffs $10.00 cost of trial. Naturally the
appellant is aggrieved.
If the cost bill has been filed within the proper time,
the court certainly should allow the filing of a supplemental
amended cost bill. See Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 Utah, 186, 72
P. 936.
POINT 4
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING
THE AMOUNT OF EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE
DEFENDANT, PAGE, IN ACQUIRING AND PRESERVING THE PROPERTY, FOR WHICH AMOUNT HE
SHOULD HAVE JUDGMENT.
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The appellant asked the court to determine that the
appellant, Page, was entitled to be reimbursed for one-half
the following expenditures which are shown in the transcript:
"a. Mrs. William Pratt, _$440.00. ~
b. Eli Taylor, $65.00. t~\
c. Recording fees incident to patent, $~.. 10. o'd. Entry on States selection, $10.00. o<..
e. Survey and engineering costs on entire property, $120.00.
f. Taxes for years 1944 to 1954, inclusive, $165.02.
g. Costs of houses and building placed on property, $400.00. JSV t:~J ":
h. Eli Taylor for legal fees in connection with the
property, $176.00.
i. LeRoy Hill, wages for moving houses, $180.00.
j. Eldon Otteson for groceries on project, $40.00.
k. Advance to Marinus Johnson, $170.00.
1. Utah County Implement cost for dead horse,
$150.00.
m. Advance to Marinus Johnson, $22.87.
n. J. W. Jones for survey on entire property,
$225.00.
o. Killpack Service Company for gas and oil in
moving house, $15.40.
p. Advance to Marinus Johnson, $22.87.
q. Central Market for groceries on project, $80.34.
r. Advance to Marinus Johnson, $35.45.
s. Chase Lumber Company for lumber for house,
$85.00.
t. LeRoy Hill bonus on moving house, $30.00."
Total:

$2,436.05.
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The expenditures shown are substantiated by testimony
and evidence shown in the transcript, and should have been
allowed. It is contended that the Court has refused to follow the instruction of the Court in that he has failed to make
a finding of such costs as were made by appellant.
CONCLUSION

The issues in this appeal are merely questions of interpretation of facts requiring no legal authority. It is respectfully submitted that the trial court has misinterpreted the
instruction of this Court, and has not entered judgment accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL J. MERRILL
JACKSON B. HOWARD
Attorneys for Appellant
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